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"PLAIN MEANING" DECISION CLARIFIES
STANDARD FOR EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS

FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT-EFFLUENT
STANDARDS: The Fourth Circuit court of appeals holds that the
Environmental Protection Agency must use both a cost-effectiveness
test and a cost-comparison test in setting best conventional technology standards for conventional pollutants from private industrial
sources. American Paper Institute v. Environmental ProtectionAgency,
16 E.R.C. 1252 (4th Cir. 1981).
INTRODUCTION

The Clean Water Act' authorizes the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate effluent limitations for
private industrial sources. 2 Conventional pollutants, 3 one of three categories of pollutants 4 named in the Act, are subject to the best conventional
pollutant control technology standard (BCT). 5 The EPA Administrator
published results of its review of effluent limitations for numerous industries in August, 1979.6
1.33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376 (1977).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1977).
3. A category which includes, but is not limited to, pollutants classified as biological oxygen
demanding, suspended solids, fecal coliform and pH. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4) (1977). EPA also
designated oil and grease as conventional pollutants. 44 Fed. Reg. 44501 (1979).
4. The three categories are conventional pollutants, toxic pollutants, and nonconventional pollutants (a category composed of all pollutants not specifically identified as conventional or toxic).
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1977).
5. Factors to be taken into account in determining best conventional pollutant control technology
measures and practices include consideration of the reasonableness of the relationship between the
costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived, and a comparison
of the cost and level of reduction of such pollutants from the discharge from publicly owned treatment
works to the cost and level of reduction of such pollutants from a class or category of industrial
sources, and a taking into account of the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process
employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types of control techniques, process
changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and other factors
as the Administrator deems appropriate. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (1977). The BCT standard for
conventional pollutants resulted from industry contentions, during congressional considerations in
1977, that the application of standards requiring best available technology economically achievable
(BAT) would entail enormous costs without comparable benefits. The response of Congress was to
lessen requirements for conventional pollutants to the BCT standard. J. QUARLES, IMPACT OF
THE 1977 CLEAN WATER ACT AMENDMENTS ON INDUSTRIAL DISCHARGERS 5 (BNA
ENVIR. REP. Monograph No. 25, 1978).
6. 44 Fed Reg. 50733 (1979).
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Thirty-four paper and chemical manufacturers, food processing companies, and trade associations sought judicial review of the Administrator's actions in American PaperInstitute v. EPA.' The petitioners challenged
the BCT regulations on several grounds. They contended that Congress
in Section 304(b)(4)(B) 8 of the 1977 Clean Water Act required EPA to
consider two factors in its determination of BCT: an industry-wide costeffectiveness test and a cost-comparison test. 9 The petitioners asserted
that EPA had considered only the latter of these two tests in setting BCT
standards and that EPA's benchmark'" for the cost-comparison test was
arbitrary and capricious. The petitioners further alleged that EPA used
statistically unreliable and internally inconsistent data as a basis for the
cost-comparison test, and that the agency deprived them of their right to
comment. "I
The Fourth Circuit analyzed the language of the section at issue and
held that its plain meaning required that cost-effectiveness be considered
in determining BCT measures and practices. 2 The court ruled that EPA
must develop an industry-wide cost-effectiveness test, 3 employ that test
in its determination of BCT regulations, and re-examine all existing BCT
regulations for inconsistency with the cost-effectiveness test. The court
agreed with the petitioners that the data on which EPA relied in formulating its reference point for publicly owned treatment works (POTWs)
for the cost-comparison test was statistically unreliable, n but ruled that
EPA's formulation of the test was not arbitrary or capricious. The court
further held that the petitioners had not been deprived of their right to
comment on the regulations.
7. 16 E.R.C. 1252 (4th Cir. 1981).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (1977).
9. The cost-comparison test compares the cost for private industry to reduce its effluent levels
to that incurred by publicly owned treatment works (POTWs), more commonly known as municipal
sewer plants.
10. The benchmark is the POTW cost figure used as the basic reference point for determining
the reasonableness of the cost figure for industry to meet BCT standards. EPA determined the
benchmark for the POTW cost-comparison figure by calculating the cost per pound of conventional
pollutant removed based on the incremental step from secondary to advanced secondary treatment.
44 Fed. Reg. 50735 (1979).
11. The petitioners specifically challenged the EPA Administrator's final regulations for the com
wet milling industry. After the parties filed their briefs, EPA suspended the BCT effluent limitations
for this industry sub-category. 45 Fed. Reg. 45582 (1980). Therefore, the court did not address the
petitioners' position on this issue.
12. The court interpreted the statutory language which requires a "consideration of the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent
reduction benefits derived" as calling for a cost-effectiveness test.
13. A cost-effectiveness test balances the incremental costs of removing a pound of pollutant with
the incremental benefits derived from the removal. AIR & WATER POLLUTION CONTROL LAW:
1980 (G. Wetstone ed. 1980). This type of test is more commonly known as a cost-benefit test.
14. Prior to the court's decision, EPA confessed to error in the two documents on which it relied
in formulating its POTW benchmark and moved the court for voluntary remand.
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STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Congress established a timetable for achieving certain water pollution
control objectives in the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. 5 Congress declared the goal of the Act to be the elimination
of discharge of pollutants into the nation's navigable waters by 1985.16
Congress set two stages towards achieving that goal utilizing two separate
standards for private industrial sources: "best practicable control technology currently available" (BPT), to be achieved by July 1, 1977,'" and
"best available technology economically available" (BAT), to be achieved
by July 1, 1983.' 8
In 1977, Congress re-examined these standards and amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, now known as the Clean Water Act. 19
The legislation established various standards and compliance schedules
for three classifications of pollutants: conventional pollutants, toxic pollutants, and non-conventional pollutants not otherwise classified.2" The
1977 BPT standards remained unchanged. The amendments applied BAT
standards to both toxic pollutants and non-conventional pollutants but
extended the compliance date to July 1, 1984.21
For conventional pollutants, Congress abandoned the BAT standard
and developed a new standard of best conventional pollutant control
technology (BCT). The Act set July 1, 1984, as the date for achievement
of BCT standards.22 BCT standards may not be more stringent than BAT
standards,23 and in no case may BCT limitations be less stringent than
15. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1972).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6) (1972).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(l)(A) (1972). BPT is defined as the establishment of a range of best
practicable levels, to be based on "the average of the best existing performance by plants of various
sizes, ages and with processes within each industrial category." I SEN. COMM. ON PUB. WORKS,
93d CONG., IST SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 169 (1973).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(B) (1972). BAT standards are intended to upgrade the levels of controls
established by the BPT limitations. I SEN. COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93d CONG., IST SESS.,
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1972, at 7.88-89. Both BPT and BAT categories require the EPA Administrator to identify, in
terms and amounts of constituents and chemical, physical, and biological characteristics of pollutants,
the degree of effluent reduction attainable for classes and categories of point sources. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1314(b)(l)(A), 1314(b)(2)(B) (1972). Point source is any conveyance from which pollutants may
be discharged. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1977). Both BPT and BAT standards involve a consideration
of costs, although BPT standards call for a cost-benefits test, a comparison of "total cost of application
of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved." 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(I)(B)
(1972).
19. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1972), as amended by Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95217, 91 Stat. 1566.
20. 33 U.S.C. §1311 (1977).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4) (1977).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (1977).
23. 44 Fed. Reg. 50732 (1979).
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BPT standards. 2 4 The 1977 amendments provided that the EPA Administrator, in providing guidelines for effluent limitations, should specify
factors to be taken into account in determining BCT measures and practices applicable to any point source within various industrial categories
and classes.2 5 These factors should
include consideration of the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and effluent
reduction benefits derived, and the comparison of the cost and level
of reduction of such pollutants from the discharge from publicly
owned treatment works to the cost and level of reduction of such
pollutants from a class or category of industrial sources and shall
take into account the age of the equipment and facilities involved,
the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of
various types of control techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such
other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate.26
Unlike limitations on toxic pollutants and unconventional pollutants,
the Clean Water Act permits no variances for BCT limitations on water
quality grounds27 or modification of the BCT timetable requirements on
innovative technology grounds. 28 Read in conjunction, these statutes imply that final BCT standards will be binding on all industrial discharge
of conventional pollutants.
On August 23, 1978, EPA published proposed BCT regulations for
numerous industries. 29 Seventy-nine parties, including industrial groups,
the Council on Wage and Price Stability, and several state governments
expressed concern with EPA's approach to development of BCT regulations. 30 The comments fell into two general categories: those objecting
to the overall methodology used by the Administrator3 and those objecting
to the individual industry data used. 32 As a result of these comments,
EPA announced that it had changed its approach and additional documents
24. Id.

25. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (1977).
26. Id.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (g) (1977). The statute excludes waivers from BCT limitations, but permits
variances from BAT standards.
28. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(c) (1977). Innovative technology is that which has a substantial likelihood
for enabling a facility to comply with the applicable effluent limitation by achieving a significantly
greater effluent reduction than that required by the applicable effluent limitation. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(k)

(1972).
29.
30.
31.
40734
32.

43 Fed. Reg.
44 Fed. Reg.
Commentors
(1979).
44 Fed. Reg.

37570 (1978).
40734 (1979).
objected specifically to the POTW and industrial calculations. 44 Fed. Reg.
40734 (1979).
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would be used in computing costs and levels of pollutants from POTWs.33
EPA published its final BCT determinations on August 29, 1979," 4 and
on May 9, 1980, petitioners asked the court to review EPA's final BCT
regulations.
ARGUMENTS REGARDING DETERMINATION OF BCT
REGULATIONS
The petitioners argued that the statute35 required EPA's proposed BCT
guidelines to pass two reasonableness tests. EPA responded that the statute36
did not require a cost-effectiveness test, but rather only a POTW costcomparison standard to arrive at BCT regulations for industry. EPA contended that the second clause in the relevant portion of the statute37 set
forth the benchmark of reasonableness required by the first clause. Thus,
the statute merely required consideration of the reasonableness of the
relationship between costs and benefits as based on figures comparing
costs for POTWs and private industry. This interpretation is consistent
with statutory interpretations of language setting forth factors for determining BPT standards.38 The BPT statute specifically calls for "consideration of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved. 3 9 This language, which clearly
calls for a cost-benefit test in setting BPT standards, points up the ambiguity of the BCT language.
EPA cited legislative history to support its position and relied on comments by Senator Muskie that the BCT legislation provided for comparison of the costs for industry with the costs for municipalities in setting
BCT standards. In presenting a report to the Senate, Senator Muskie had
stated, "[cllearly, if the cost of achieving a certain level of reduction of
conventional pollutants for industry is less than the cost of achieving a
similar level of reduction for a community, it would be reasonable." 4 0
33. 44 Fed. Reg. 19214 (1979). The petitioning industries objected to EPA's use of these documents on the ground that they were not given sufficient time to comment. The court evaluated the
charges and found that EPA had complied with Section 4 of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(3), in regard to notice. In light of the general availability of the documents and
extensiveness of the comments, the facts did not support the petitioners' contention that they were
denied adequate notice. American Paper Institute v. EPA, 16 E.R.C. 1252 (4th Cir. 1981).
34. 44 Fed. Reg. 50732 (1979).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (1977).
36. Id.
37. The statute calls for "consideration of the reasonableness of the relationship between the
costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and effluent reduction benefits derived, and the comparison
of the cost and level of reduction of such pollutants from aclass or category of industrial sources.
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (1977).
38. 33 § 1314(b)(l)(B) (1977).
39. Id.
40. 123 CONG REC. S19637 (1977).
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The petitioners argued that the statute clearly required EPA's proposed
BCT guidelines to pass two tests for reasonableness: a cost-effectiveness
test and a cost-comparison test. The petitioners countered EPA's legislative history argument by quoting Representative Roberts' apparent reference to an industry cost-effectiveness test in his statement explaining
BCT. Representative Roberts stated that in assessing the need for BCT,
the EPA Administrator is required to consider the reasonableness of the
relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and
the effluent reduction benefits derived. Although Representative Roberts
did not specifically refer to a cost-effectiveness test, he implied that BCT
regulations should not impose effluent limitations resulting in incremental
costs which exceed incremental benefits. 4 '
The Fourth Circuit used the plain meaning rule in determining that the
statute unambiguously required both a cost-effectiveness test and a costcomparison test in setting BCT standards. The plain meaning rule, as set
out in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, holds that "EPA must be held
to a standard of at least literal compliance with the language of a statute
which it is authorized to implement."'42
Determining that EPA's construction of the statute was contrary to the
plain meaning of the language, the court held that the section specifically
charged EPA to consider a cost-effectiveness test as well as a POTW costcomparison test in formulating standards for BCT. The court stated that
EPA ignored the mandatory "shall" in the statute, disregarded the conjunctive "and" and completely eliminated the first factor, which calls for
"consideration of the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs
of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits
derived." Holding that the language was unambiguous, the court remanded the regulations to EPA for reconsideration.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Phillips disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that Congress unambiguously required the EPA Administrator
to use a two-part test in formulating BCT regulations. He stated that the
statute was so ambiguous that legislative history must provide guidance
for its interpretation. Because he found the legislative history in this case
to be inconclusive, Judge Phillips would have deferred to EPA's interpretation. He concluded that the court had mistakenly determined that a
plain meaning existed for the statute in question.
Petitioners also challenged EPA's formation and application of the
POTW cost-comparison test on three grounds. First, they argued that
EPA erred in using an incremental approach to arrive at a POTW bench41. 123 CONG. REC. H12928 (1977).
42. 545 F.2d 1351, 1357 (4th Cir. 1976).
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mark.43 Second, they contended that, even if EPA were permitted to use
an incremental POTW comparison, EPA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in setting the benchmark for the POTW-private industry comparison test. Third, the petitioners objected to the POTW cost data as
being inadequate and statistically unreliable.
The court found nothing on the face of the statute or in its legislative
history to suggest that Congress intended for EPA to structure or administer the test in any particular way. The EPA considered various proposals
before selecting the cost-comparison test. Therefore, the selection of the
benchmark was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
The court discarded the petitioners' argument that EPA should have
used a narrower increment.' Quoting from Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, the court
stated that it "must look at the decision not as the chemist, biologist or
statistician . . . but as a reviewing court exercising our narrowly defined45
duty of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of rationality.
EPA provided evidence that it had considered recommendations from
both the Corn Refiners Association, Inc., and the Council on Wage and
Price Stability in deciding to use a particular incremental POTW benchmark. 46 The court concluded that it was "unwilling to place a straitjacket
on EPA to so limit its decision."
EPA admitted to errors in the documents on which the agency based
the POTW benchmark. Petitioners had challenged the documents as inadequate, statistically unreliable and internally inconsistent. In response
to EPA's admission, the court remanded the POTW benchmark to EPA
for correction of data errors and consequent revision of BCT regulations.
JUDICIAL BACKGROUND
The Plain Meaning Rule
Judicial interpretation of statutory construction generally follows three
doctrines. Courts tend to rely on legislative history, defer to agency
construction of the statute, or make a decision based on independent
consideration of the merits.47 The Fourth Circuit's use of the plain meaning
43. EPA's test compared the cost of upgrading POTWs from secondary treatment levels (the level
required for achievement by July 1, 1977) to a level beyond secondary treatment. This increment
roughly parallels the industrial increment from BPT to BAT.
44. The POTW incremental cost is the cost of upgrading an existing POTW from one treatment
level to a higher level.
45. 541 F.2d I, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
46. EPA used Advanced Secondary Treatment as the increment beyond secondary treatment for
the POTW benchmark.
47. R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 105

(1981).
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rule in American PaperInstitute is contrary to other judicial interpretations
which have deferred to EPA's construction of a statute in cases of conflicts
in legislative history. Despite the court's insistence that the statute in
question is unambiguous, the court noted the inconclusiveness of legislative history. When such conflicts exist, the statute is inherently unclear.
Thus, the court misapplied the plain meaning rule in American Paper
Institute.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld EPA's statutory interpretation in several cases by appropriately evoking the plain meaning
rule. In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,48 the statute in question
involved the authority of the EPA Administrator to promulgate effluent
limitations. In Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,49 the statute

related to the EPA Administrator's review of state implementation plans
under the Clean Air Act amendments. The du Pont decision relied upon
the following language from Train to support the theory that the court
should defer to agency interpretation in questions of statutory construction:
We therefore conclude that the Agency's interpretation ...

was "cor-

rect," to the extent that it can be said with complete assurance that
any particular interpretation of a complex statute such as this is the
"correct" one. Given this conclusion, as well as the facts that the
Agency is charged with administration of the Act, and that there has
undoubtedly been reliance upon its interpretation by the States and
other parties affected by the Act, we have no doubt whatever that
its construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of
Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency.5"
Although courts have generally used the plain meaning rule to support
EPA's interpretation of a statute, 5' the Fourth Circuit's decision in American Paper Institute uses the plain meaning rule to support industry's
position. When the Fourth Circuit ruled against EPA's statutory interpretation in EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n,5" EPA appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which overturned the decision. Yet in
American PaperInstitute, EPA's counsel has expressed satisfaction with
the Fourth Circuit's decision. 3 Apparently, EPA has no plans to appeal
the decision to the Supreme Court.
48. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
49. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
50. Id. at 87.
51. The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in EPA v. Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980),
overruled the fourth circuit's decision by using the plain meaning rule. The Supreme Court upheld
EPA's interpretation of the statute, rather than the fourth circuit's, and cited legislative history in
support of its decision.
52. 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
53. NAT'L L.J.,August 17, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
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The Cost of Meeting Effluent Limitations
The requirement of meeting effluent limitations for discharge of pollutants places great costs on industry. Accordingly, various industries have
sought to minimize the burdensome costs through challenges to all three
standards: BPT, BAT, and BCT.
One of industry's major contentions has been that cost-benefit analyses
are required for the determination of both BPT54 and BAT5 standards.
The American Paper Institute's challenge to BCT standards is founded
on a similar premise, with the goal of reducing the cost of compliance.
When a statute or court requires EPA to carry out a cost-benefit analysis
in setting effluent limitations, EPA may encounter difficulties in demonstrating that benefits are equal to or exceed costs of meeting the limitations. Because of its necessarily subjective nature, any such judgment
is subject to the scrutiny of industry and the courts. Additionally, although
a statute may require EPA merely to consider costs, rather than perform
a cost-benefit analysis, EPA still bears a heavy burden in justifying a
decision that costs bear a reasonable relation to benefits.
BPT and BAT effluent limitations require different analyses. In setting
BPT standards, EPA must perform cost-benefit analyses. The statute requires "consideration of the total cost of application of technology in
relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such reduction." 5' 6 These cost-benefit tests are performed on an industry-wide
basis, not for individual plants within an industrial category. Variances
from BPT standards are available only upon a showing of a fundamental
difference in factors in existence at an individual plant from factors considered by EPA in promulgating standards for the particular industry. 7
Industries have also attacked BAT standards in an effort to reduce costs
of compliance. In addition to the recent challenge to BCT limitations,
the American Paper Institute challenged BAT standards prior to the 1977
Clean Water Act amendments. 8 The District of Columbia circuit court
ruled that no cost-benefit balancing was required for BAT limitations nor
for new source performance standards. The court held that the EPA Administrator should merely consider costs in establishing standards. The
United States Supreme Court failed to grant certiorari.
Sources subject to BAT limitations may obtain variances or time extensions on several grounds. Some of these grounds include economic
infeasibility 9 and proposed innovative technology. 60
54. 33 U.S.C.
55. 33 U.S.C.
56. 33 U.S.C.
57. 40 C.F.R.
58. American
967 (1977).
59. 33 U.S.C.
60. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1314(b)(1)(B) (1977).
§ 1314(b)(2)(B) (1977).
§ 1314(b)(1)(B) (1977).
§§401-460.
Paper Institute v. Train, 543 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
§ 1311(b)(2)(A) (1977).
§ 1311(k) (1977).
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The BCT standard for conventional pollutants is comparable to the
BAT standard for other pollutants. BCT limitations may not be more
stringent than BAT limitations, 6" and the statutes make no provisions for
variances.6 2 The BCT standard was intended to replace the BAT standard
for conventional pollutants.63 Therefore, EPA's interpretation that merely
a consideration of the reasonableness of costs was required in setting
BCT standards is understandable. Since BCT and BAT limitations are
comparable for different categories of pollutants, the factors determining
the development of each standard should also be comparable.
The fourth circuit's decision that the statute requires a cost-effectiveness
test will probably lead to lower standards, allowing a greater discharge
of conventional pollutants. In addition, the process of conducting this
test will lead to delay in promulgation of standards, and delay means
economic benefits for industry.
CONCLUSION
The decision in the present case is an economic victory for the industries
represented. The American Paper Institute's counsel has said that EPA
rules, had they been upheld, would have cost $2 billion for almost no
clean up at all.' A point always exists at which the costs of pollution
control are no longer warranted by resulting incremental benefits. EPA's
evaluation of the reasonableness of the costs would seem to have given
adequate consideration to the incremental benefits as compared to the
costs.
The statute requires compliance with BCT standards by July 1, 1984.65
Such a compliance date is now impossible. Before proposing new regulations, EPA must conduct further tests. The cost of these new determinations will no doubt impose a hardship on the agency, which is at
present operating under severe budget constraints.
Courts have taken notice of the effects of delay in setting and meeting
effluent limitations. The Fourth Circuit recognized the problems in its
opinion in FMC Corp. v. Train,66 but in the present case it took no notice
of its earlier warning.
While EPA must take seriously a statutory duty to consider cost,
courts of review should be mindful of the many problems inherent
in an undertaking of this nature and uphold a reasonable effort by
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

44 Fed. Reg. 50732 (1979).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(c), (g) (1977).
44 Fed. Reg. 50732 (1979).
NAT'L L.J., August 17, 1981, at 3, col. I.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E) (1977).
539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976).
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the Agency. The requirement [that costs be considered] should not
serve as a dilatory device, obstructing the Agency from proceeding
with its primary mission of cleaning up the lakes, rivers and streams
of this Nation. 67
Judge Phillips echoed these sentiments in his dissent to the majority
opinion in American PaperInstitute. He noted that the 1977 amendments
called for EPA to have BCT regulations in place
within 90 days after
69
enactment, 61 a date "now long since passed."
Although the result of American Paper Institute would appear to be a
victory for private industry and a defeat for EPA, Ralph Perry, EPA's
general counsel, has said that the court's decision "appears to be compatible with our philosophy." 7° The philosophy to which Perry referred
is the Reagan Administration's espousal of cost-effectiveness analyses in
the development of environmental regulations affecting industry.
Perry has also stated that EPA expects to propose new regulations
implementing the court's decision within a year. Perry conceded that the
new regulations will give greater weight to costs of industry, but he
insisted that the environmental impact of the discharge of conventional
pollutants by private industry will not be ignored. "We are the Environmental Protection Agency and we are going to protect the environment. " 7'
The EPA's published reaction to the decision may be a harbinger of
future agency policy. Whether the decision will lead to a softening of
effluent limitation standards and a consequent strain on municipal sewer
treatment plants is open to speculation. A cost-effectiveness analysis is a
complex measure, and its development will require time and money. EPA
is in the process of changing its policies and structure to reflect the goals
of the Reagan Administration. Environmentalists are waiting to see if
EPA will be able to retain its goal of achieving zero discharge of pollutants
into navigable waters by 1985. Economics, which to date have been
merely a factor in setting limitations, may assume a pre-eminent role in
determination of effluent limitations and in implementation of clean water
goals.
SUSAN WECKESSER

67. Id. at 979.

68. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(6) (1977).
69. 16 E.R.C. 1252, 1262 (1981).
70. NAT'L L.J., August 17, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
71. Id..

